

Internal Audit Report

New England House: Lessons Learned

(Final)

Assignment Manager: Russell Banks, Chief Internal Auditor
Prepared for: Brighton & Hove City Council
Date: March 2025

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1. Introduction and Issue

- 1.1. On 11 November 2024, Internal Audit received a request from the Council's Chief Executive to conduct a lessons-learned review following the decision to temporarily close New England House (NEH), a Council owned property hosting 99 business tenants.
- 1.2. The decision was taken following receipt of a report from fire safety consultants which stated there were critical deficiencies in the building that would lead to significant and potentially devastating consequences if there was a fire.
- 1.3. It is understood that the situation leading to the closure arose despite the Council receiving a report from fire safety consultants outlining the issues facing the building in July 2020.
- 1.4. The aim of the lessons-learned review was to help the organisation understand how this situation had arisen and identify improvements that could be made to avoid future repetition.

2. Scope and Work Undertaken

- 2.1. The review sought to establish the circumstances leading up to the decision to temporarily close NEH, including identifying what reports and information were available in advance of the decision being made. All reports identified are documented in appendix one.
- 2.2. The agreed scope of the review also included establishing:
 - Arrangements for assessing the building condition and fire safety arrangements at NEH.
 - Decision-making regarding the development of, and investment in, the building since 2020.
 - Arrangements for managing property maintenance and improvement programmes, including the decision-making over the prioritisation, monitoring and reporting of work.
- 2.3. The review carried out by Internal Audit focussed on an examination and analysis of the following:
 - Reports and correspondence regarding fire safety at NEH.
 - Committee Reports regarding ongoing issues and work.
 - Project documentation associated with NEH.
 - Management Contract for NEH.
 - Outlook files of the former Assistant Director of Property and Design.
 - CIVICA Financial, Purchasing, and General Ledger Reports for spend at NEH.
- 2.4. Meetings have also been conducted with staff working in Property and Design, Programme Management, and Legal Services as well as relevant service directors. In addition, a meeting was held with staff from East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service (ESFRS).

3. Executive Summary

- 3.1. The aim of the lessons-learned review was to help the organisation understand the circumstances leading up to the decision to temporarily close NEH and identify improvements to avoid a future repetition.
- 3.2. Whilst NEH is a Council owned building, management of the building is outsourced to a management agent, **REDACTED**. There is a contract in place between the Council and **REDACTED** that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each party. The contract is clear that, whilst the Council remain responsible for the maintenance of the building, **REDACTED** are required to perform certain activities to ensure that the Council are kept up to date regarding the maintenance requirements of the building. The review found evidence that **REDACTED** is not fulfilling its contractual duties, and that Council staff have not taken action to address this. Furthermore, staff do not appear to have a full understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each party, and this has led to confusion in managing ongoing maintenance and fire safety concerns at the building.
- 3.3. The review found evidence that the Council received numerous reports regarding the building condition and fire safety concerns at NEH prior to the decision to temporarily close the building. This includes reports from surveys commissioned by the project team working on the refurbishment of the building, as well as regular reports commissioned by **REDACTED**, such as the annual fire risk assessment. Despite these various reports having been received, staff in receipt of them have failed to understand the risks outlined, recognise the urgency in managing these risks, and escalate concerns to senior management where appropriate.
- 3.4. However, a review of the reports and documentation available found that these often contained contradictory information, and that this may have hampered staff's understanding of the risks at the building and urgency for managing these. This is clearly demonstrated by two reports received just nine days apart, one of which states that there were critical deficiencies in the building that would lead to significant and potentially devastating consequences if there was a fire, and the other stating that the fire risk was 'low.' Various internal documents have also been produced stating that the building was safe and could remain open. It is noted, however, that ESFRS were not consulted on the contradictory information received, and that if they had been, this may have impacted on any decision to temporarily close the building.
- 3.5. In addition, there has been a lack of project management and governance around the project historically, and this has meant that project activity has not been effectively monitored. Whilst a Programme Manager has been in place since the initiation, there is a lack of project documentation available outlining the aims and objectives, project plan, key deliverables, decision-making, and risk and issues. Furthermore, the project previously lacked a clearly defined governance structure and, whilst an officer group was in place, there is insufficient documentation available to confirm the group met regularly and had full oversight of project risks, issues, decisions, and actions. The lack of a clearly defined governance structure and formal project management arrangements has meant that the roles and responsibilities of staff working on the project have not been clearly defined and, as a result, staff appear to be unclear on who is responsible for actioning tasks and escalating concerns.

- 3.6. In addition to the above, it is clear from meetings with staff that the Council did not have the financial resources or staff required to deliver a large-scale project such as the proposed development of NEH. The funding requirements of £24.53m were not obtained and progress of the project appears to have been reliant on staff within the Architect and Design Team, who themselves were stood down to focus on other work during the COVID-19 pandemic. When staff on the Architect and Design Team were reappointed in 2023, the lack of project documentation severely hampered progress, and resulted in several surveys and reports being recommissioned at significant financial cost to the Council.
- 3.7. In conclusion, several factors impacted on staff failing to escalate the fire safety concerns at NEH to senior management, including the lack of formal project management arrangements, lack of project governance, and the lack of understanding relating to the roles and responsibilities of staff working on the project, and those managing the contract between the Council and **REDACTED**. However, it should be noted that action has now been taken to address some of these factors, with a new Project Manager being appointed and a clearly defined governance structure being put in place enabling senior management to have clear oversight of the project.

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4. Detailed Findings

Brief History of NEH

- 4.1. In March 2014, a City Deal for the Greater Brighton City Region was agreed with Government and marked the start of a long-term commitment to investing in and developing the area. A focal point of the City Deal programme was the refurbishment and expansion of NEH to create a 'technical hub' for the South-East area.
- 4.2. The project required a total investment of £24.53m to enable the refurbishment and expansion of NEH and it was proposed that the private sector would invest £9.8m, the Council £9.8m and the Government £4.9m. Grant funding of £4.9m was received from the Government in 2014, and the Council later secured a further £6.1m from a land deal via its freehold interest in the Longley Industrial Estate. The funding was ringfenced for the refurbishment and expansion of NEH.
- 4.3. Following the establishment of a project team, the Council's Architect and Design Team were instructed to conduct a series of feasibility studies to consider the potential options for the development of the building. A preferred option was identified at the end of 2019 and the project progressed to a design phase which included the completion of due diligence checks. This included commissioning fire safety consultants, **REDACTED**, to conduct a fire safety survey of the building.
- 4.4. A report detailing the findings of the survey, which included fire safety issues, was received by the Council on 21 July 2020. The report referenced a previous report produced by the managing agent, **REDACTED**, entitled 'Review of Condition of New England House' that had been published in November 2017, and had also highlighted fire safety concerns in the building.
- 4.5. Following receipt of the report in 2020, the NEH project brief changed to focus on the fire safety concerns raised as part of the survey. However, a subsequent report received by the Council in 2023 identified that no action had been taken to address the fire safety concerns highlighted by these previous reports.

Lack of Project Management

- 4.6. Project management involves planning, organising, and managing a project to achieve a predefined goal or outcome. For a large-scale project such as the refurbishment and expansion of NEH, we would expect to find formal project management arrangements in place, including, but not limited to:
 - Documentation outlining the purpose of the project.
 - Details of key stakeholders including their roles and responsibilities.
 - A project plan outlining key deliverables and milestones.
 - A risk and issues log.
 - Mechanisms for managing changes to the project plan.

- 4.7. Historically, the refurbishment and expansion of NEH has lacked formal project management arrangements. Whilst a Programme Manager was in place from the initiation of the project, no project documentation appears to be available detailing the aims and objectives, project plan, key deliverables, or project milestones. Furthermore, there is no documentation detailing the variation from a project focused on the refurbishment and expansion of the building to a project managing fire safety concerns (following receipt of the report in 2020).
- 4.8. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of staff involved in the project have not been clearly defined. The lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities was demonstrated by staff interviewed as part of this review who were unable to confirm who was responsible for specific project tasks and documentation. This lack of clarity has resulted in key tasks often being duplicated or not completed.
- 4.9. The absence of sufficient clarity around roles and responsibilities has also resulted in some staff conducting tasks that they believed were outside of their normal remit. For example, staff in the Architect and Design Team took action to manage tenant behaviour at NEH following a site visit in June 2024. During the visit, it was identified that propane gas was being stored in several tenant units. The findings of the visit were reported to staff, but no action was taken. This led to a Senior Architect sending an email that read *'Without wishing to over-step the mark, please can I request that, together with REDACTED, you instruct those tenants highlighted in the attached document to remove propane from the building with immediate effect?'*
- 4.10. It is noted, however, that a Project Manager was appointed to formally manage the project in September 2024 and, since their appointment, project documentation, including a Terms of Reference, risk and issue log, and action plan have been put in place.

Lack of Project Governance

- 4.11. In addition to formal project management arrangements, we would expect a large-scale project such as the refurbishment and expansion of NEH to have a clearly defined governance structure in place to oversee the delivery of the project. The review found that, historically, the project has lacked such a governance structure and, as a result, there has been inadequate management oversight of the activities.
- 4.12. A crucial element of effective governance is ensuring that project objectives are appropriately approved and that staff working on a project have a clear understanding of the objectives. If the objectives change, for instance from a refurbishment to fire safety project, we would expect mechanisms to be in place to ensure the change is appropriately approved and communicated to staff working on the project. It is noted that the project brief changed when the fire consultant's report was received in July 2020. However, due to the lack of formal governance arrangement, there is no documentation detailing the change, that it was appropriately approved or that it was effectively communicated to staff working on the project.
- 4.13. An Officer Group was in place from the outset of the project, and membership included senior officers and staff from Project Management, Property and Design, and Finance. However, whilst the previous Programme Manager advised that the group met regularly, there is insufficient documentation to confirm the frequency of meetings, attendees, and topics addressed. Furthermore, the previous Programme Manager advised that whilst senior officers

were part of the group, they did not always attend meetings and therefore did not have full oversight of the project.

- 4.14. It is noted that an Officer Group meeting took place on 6 August 2020 to discuss the content of report received on 21 July 2020 and notes from this meeting are available. The notes record that staff from Property and Design attended the meeting along with the consultant who produced the report. However, representatives from senior management, Legal, and Health and Safety were not present nor were they included in the circulation list to receive the minutes. As a result, they did not have full oversight of the discussion that took place or actions that were required.
- 4.15. Furthermore, the previous Programme Manager has advised that, following the receipt of the fire consultant report, **REDACTED** were appointed to project manage the fire safety works at NEH. A review of notes from several meetings held with **REDACTED** also found that senior management were not involved in these meetings, nor were they included on the circulation list for the minutes. Whilst senior management may not regularly attend project meetings when no issues have been identified, given the findings of the fire consultant's report, we would expect them to be included in the circulation of meeting minutes or for a clear escalation procedure to be in place.
- 4.16. It is clear that, historically, this project has lacked a clearly defined escalation procedure, and this has resulted in staff failing to escalate risks to senior management when appropriate. Our review identified several examples as follows:
- On 5 December 2020, a report was submitted to Policy and Resource Committee outlining the preferred option for development of the building and requesting agreement to proceed with the plans. However, the report fails to reference the fire safety concerns raised in July 2020.
 - On 12 March 2024, the Council received an 'Intolerable and Substantial Risk' letter from the managing agent, **REDACTED**. The letter stated that fire safety work was 865 days overdue and referenced both the **REDACTED** and **REDACTED** reports. However, senior management were not made aware of the letter or briefed on the urgency of the risks associated with NEH at this time.
 - On 26 June 2024, the Architect and Design Team conducted a site visit to NEH with fire safety consultants and the managing agent, **REDACTED**. Tenant units were inspected, and propane gas canisters were identified as being stored in the building. A further report was produced by the fire safety consultant and issued to the Officer Group on 15 July 2024. On 6 August 2024, a member of the Architecture and Design Team emailed a council lawyer raising concerns that no action had been taken and seeking advice on the storage and use of propane gas. At this point, three weeks after the initial visit, the concerns were escalated to senior managers.
 - On 4 November 2024, a meeting was held with the fire safety consultant to discuss previous reports and the more recent concerns regarding the storage of propane gas. All staff involved in the meeting were aware that the building would possibly need to be urgently decanted. This included senior managers. However, the matter was not escalated to the Council's Chief Executive until 8 November 2024.

- 4.17. Staff interviewed as part of the review were unclear who was responsible for escalating risks, with some staff concerned about 'going over a colleague's head.'
- 4.18. As referenced above, since the appointment of the new Project Manager, a clear governance structure has now been put in place, which includes a Strategic Corporate Group, with defined roles and responsibilities and oversight of the project.
- 4.19. The newly formed Strategic Corporate Group meet regularly, and the first meeting took place on 11 November 2024. The minutes record that the staff present, helping to ensure appropriate oversight at all levels. Actions arising from the meeting are also now being documented in the minutes and can be tracked.

Lack of Contract Management

- 4.20. Whilst NEH is a Council-owned building, management of the building is outsourced to a managing agent, **REDACTED**. A contract entitled 'Framework Agreement for the Provision of Commercial Portfolio Estate Managed Services' is in place between the Council and the managing agent, who is recorded as being GVA Grimley Limited. Open-source enquiries have confirmed that **REDACTED** acquired GVA Grimley Limited in 2019. The contract is signed and dated by representatives from the Council and **REDACTED** on 3 February 2020.
- 4.21. The original contract commenced on 2 February 2018 for a period of five-years, ending 31 March 2023, with an option to extend for a further two-years. The contract is currently out to tender and due to be renewed as of 1 April 2025.
- 4.22. Schedule one of the contract provides a detailed specification regarding the expected roles and responsibilities of both parties.
- 4.23. Section 4 of schedule one refers to Estate Management and specifies '*Unless otherwise specified, the Authorised Officer at Brighton & Hove City Council is the **REDACTED**, who is delegated to manage the Council's Commercial and Agricultural property portfolio and to undertake client functions under various contracts with third parties including those related to property management. Such roles and functions are delegated to a certain extent operationally to the **REDACTED**, who will act as client for day-to-day management issues whilst **REDACTED**, retains a strategic role and will act as client for issues such as policy development, strategy reviews, and the more significant and political issues as part of the management contract.*'
- 4.24. The contract specifies that the managing agent is expected to meet with the Council's Authorised Officer monthly to discuss the day-to-day management of the contract and continued management of the estate.
- 4.25. The contract is also clear that, whilst management of the building is outsourced to **REDACTED**, the Council remain responsible for managing and approving ongoing maintenance issues. Section 9.1 of schedule one refers to Building Maintenance and states '*Although the Council seeks as a matter of course to let its property on Full Repairing and Insuring leases there are buildings for which the Council has responsibility for some aspect of maintenance.*' The contract goes on to specify that '*Not later than 30 April each year, a report should be submitted by the*

Service Provider to the Authorised Officer setting out recommendations for building maintenance programme for the ensuing financial year.'

- 4.26. Appendix 1 of the contract specifically refers to the Council's Commercial Portfolio and this includes NEH. Section 3.5 of appendix one states *'In addition to maintenance liabilities, the Council is also responsible for improvements to part of its commercial portfolio. In this respect the Service Provider will prepare, no later than 20 September each year, a report setting out recommendations for capital building works for the forthcoming three financial years.'*
- 4.27. Despite the clear contract conditions set out above, our review has found evidence that **REDACTED** has not been fulfilling its responsibilities as outlined in the contract and that staff managing the contract have not taken action to address this. For example, the contract manager has advised that **REDACTED** have failed to provide regular reports detailing the maintenance requirements at NEH. However, no action has been taken to address this.
- 4.28. In addition, there is a lack of understanding regarding the roles and responsibilities of staff working for the Council and **REDACTED**. For example, following receipt of the report on 21 July 2020, a member of the Architecture & Design Team emailed senior managers to highlight the fire safety concerns at NEH and advise that immediate action was required. A senior manager responded in an email on 31 July 2020 implying that **REDACTED** were responsible for addressing the risk. The email read *'This is concerning as REDACTED are the same managing agents who manage the building currently for us and we need to understand why REDACTED have not addressed these issues and what they are going to do to put this right. It seems their lack of action has put the council at risk.'* The email goes on to state *'in the first instance please discuss the matter with (Estates Team) so that property as Client has clarity on our landlord and agents roles /responsibilities, contractual liabilities.'*
- 4.29. The lack of understanding is further demonstrated in an email on 6 August 2020 from a senior manager to **REDACTED**, in which **REDACTED** are requested to prepare a programme of actions to resolve the risks identified by the report with a timetable of when the actions will be completed.
- 4.30. The Director for Real Estate at **REDACTED** responded to the above email on 28 August 2020 providing their observations regarding the fire consultant's report and a schedule of actions to address the identified risks. However, the Director suggests that some of the risks are addressed as part of the ongoing refurbishment and expansion programme, and this appears to have been accepted by Council staff. In addition, whilst a schedule of actions was provided, it is unclear who was responsible for completing the actions and, as a result, they were not progressed.
- 4.31. It is noted that monthly contract meetings between the Council and **REDACTED** are occurring, with the last meeting taking place on 26 November 2024. The agenda for the meeting records that this as a 'Portfolio' meeting, discussing all properties managed by **REDACTED** and does not specifically address the issues at NEH.
- 4.32. Finally, staff have advised that there is a perceived 'lack of trust' between the Council and **REDACTED**, suggesting there has been a breakdown of relationship, and this could potentially have impacted on the timeliness of the action being taken to address the issues at NEH.

Volume of Reports and Information Available

- 4.33. As has been highlighted above, numerous reports regarding the building condition and fire safety at NEH have been received from various organisations at a significant cost to the Council. A list of reports and associated costs are attached at appendix one.
- 4.34. Our review found a lack of collaboration between teams working on the project with several teams and **REDACTED** all commissioning different organisations to conduct surveys and produce reports, which have often resulted in contradictory findings. For example, the **REDACTED** report received by the Council on 21 July 2020 stated that there were critical deficiencies in the NEH building that would lead to significant and potentially devastating consequences if there was a fire. However, at the same time, **REDACTED** commissioned **REDACTED** to conduct the annual fire safety risk assessment, and their report was received on 31 July 2020 stating that the risk was 'low.'
- 4.35. Several internal briefing documents have also been produced providing contradictory information to that stated in the report of 21 July 2020. For example, on 17 December 2020, the Council's lead for fire safety produced a briefing document for senior managers that stated *'it is deemed that the risk to life in case of fire at New England House is low. The risk to property, in case of fire is considered to be medium to high, due to the damaged compartmentalisation. For these reasons, I advise it is not necessary to shut down the building until the work has been carried out.'*
- 4.36. It is noted that the above briefing document references comprehensive discussions with both **REDACTED** and ESFRS. However, at the time of this review, staff at ESFRS had not had sight of the fire consultant's report from 2020, and whilst they did meet Council staff at NEH in December 2020, this was an informal discussion around improving fire safety in the building. No inspection of the building or tenant units took place.
- 4.37. The high volume of reports and internal briefing documents with often contradictory information may have impacted on staff's understanding of the potential risk at NEH and, as a result, they have failed to act with urgency to escalate matters where appropriate.
- 4.38. Despite the high volume of reports that have been received, it is noted that little action appears to have been taken in response to any of the reports' findings. This has often led to duplicate surveys being conducted and reports being produced several years later. As an example, **REDACTED** have produced several fire safety reports and **REDACTED** have produced several appraisals of the building since 2020.

Lack of Staff Resources

- 4.39. The refurbishment and expansion of NEH is a large-scale project that requires resources from several different service areas. However, it is unclear which service area was ultimately responsible for progressing the project. Furthermore, several staff have commented that there has been a lack of resources to deal with such a large-scale project whilst attempting to deliver business as usual activities.

- 4.40. Historically, progress of the project appears to have been reliant on staff working in the Architect and Design Team. However, there appears to have been a hiatus in progress during the COVID-19 pandemic when staff in this team were 'stood down' and instructed to focus on other projects. Some staff were stood down for several years shortly after the fire consultant report was received in July 2020 and this may have impacted on the progress made to address the findings detailed in the report.

Lack of Financial Resources

- 4.41. As previously noted, the project required a total investment of £24.53m to enable the refurbishment and expansion of NEH and, whilst the Council received grant funding of £4.9m and £6.1m from a land deal, it did not raise the rest of the funding, leaving a significant shortfall in the total investment required to complete the project.
- 4.42. Staff have confirmed that, despite the financial resources to deliver the preferred option for the development of the building not being available, the project continued to progress to a design phase, leading to the commissioning of various surveys at a significant cost to the Council.
- 4.43. The lack of available funding may have also contributed to the failure to address the fire safety concerns, which were recently estimated as costing approximately £27m in a feasibility study produced by REDACTED. This is corroborated by the current Project Manager, who has drafted a discussion paper that notes the work required is complex and will cost an estimated £26.29m. The paper also states that the previous funding that was ringfenced for the refurbishment and expansion of NEH has now been spent, with £10.07m remaining allocated within the Council's capital programme.

Continuity of Record Keeping

- 4.44. Historically, there has not been a central repository or defined member of staff responsible for maintaining records relating to NEH. This has resulted in a lack of audit trail of work conducted, and consequently various survey being commissioned more than once.
- 4.45. The lack of central repository has also meant that staff newly appointed to, or returning to, the project have been unable to easily identify progress made and action required. This is potentially an explanation to why duplicate surveys were requested when staff were reappointed to the project in 2023.
- 4.46. It is noted, however, that since the appointment of the new Project Manager, a SharePoint site has been established to store all documentation relating to NEH.

5. Recommendations

In response to the issues highlighted above, the table below contains a number of recommendations for management to consider, all of which are intended to strengthen arrangements and help avoid future repetition.

#	Recommendation	Agreed Action
1	All staff involved in contract management should undertake relevant training to ensure they fully understand their roles and responsibilities relating to the management of contracts.	Included in the priority programme of training for leadership development, People and Innovation Team to lead on this action.
2	In the case of all projects, appropriate and proportionate project management disciplines should be applied, in line with organisational standards. As a minimum, this should include fundamentals such as a project brief and project plan with timescales, roles and responsibilities and resources clearly defined.	Innovation team to review current approach to and principles of programme and project management and lead on training and development for all involved in leading projects and programmes
3	The Council should consider mechanisms for helping to ensure that all staff, whether working on defined projects, or delivering business as usual activities, understand their responsibilities with regard to raising concerns and escalating issues of importance. This may be through establishing guidance and embedding behaviours within the organisational culture.	As part of the Programme and Project management training the importance of escalation via 1 to 1's and project board processes to be emphasised and embedded. As part of this, a lessons learnt session at Leadership Network looking at Grenfell lessons learnt, with action for leaders to take this learning into teams.
4	For all projects, appropriate arrangements should be put in place to ensure that all relevant project records and documentation are retained and accessible, possibly through a relevant SharePoint site. This will enable an audit trail of project activity and decision-making and will help ensure continuity of record-keeping in the event of staff turnover.	Standard approach for retention of project documentation using SharePoint/Teams Groups to be developed and rolled out via BIMs.
5	Given the costs involved, care should be taken to ensure that external surveys and reports are only commissioned where there is an appropriate need. Where such reports are received, management should ensure that appropriate action is taken in response to any findings and recommendations.	Clear governance structure for all programmes, and clear ownership of any report commissioned – with clarity on the reason that a report is commissioned, expected outcomes from the report, and who is responsible for taking forward recommendations before reports are commissioned.

6	Staff should arrange a full consultation with the fire safety consultant, REDACTED , and ESFRS, in order to come to a definitive view as to the fire safety concerns at NEH. Any actions required as a result should be immediately addressed in order to ensure the building is safe for continued use.	Action to support this recommendation is occurring monthly, including Fire Consultant, Programme Manager, lead architect and Fire Consultant.
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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Reports Available:

Date	Produced by:	Title	Comments	Cost
November 2017	REDACTED	Review of Condition of New England House.	Unclear who commissioned the report, who received it and what action was taken.	Unknown.
21 July 2020	REDACTED	New England House Appraisal of the Existing Building.	Report identifies the consequences for life safety, in the event of fire, could be 'Extreme Harm.'	£13,974
31 July 2020	REDACTED	Fire Risk Assessment.	Provided to the Council on 28 August 2020. States the fire risk is low.	£1,390
31 July 2020	REDACTED	Health and Safety Report.	Provided to the Council on 28 August 2020. States the risk is low.	Included in above price.
2 September 2020	REDACTED	Appraisal of Concrete Frame.		£2,220
7 December 2020	Internal Briefing Note	Briefing Note – Fire Safety Deficiencies in New England House.	States a site visit has been conducted with REDACTED and ESFRS. States the risk to life is low and building can remain open.	
8 December 2020	REDACTED	Appraisal of Concrete Frame.		£3,888
29 September 2021	REDACTED	Annual Fire Survey.	Commissioned by REDACTED.	£1,520
14 July 2023	REDACTED	Fire Door and Compartmentation Survey.	Commissioned by Morgan Sindall. States that fire doors and compartmentation are inadequate and require immediate action.	£86,729

Appendices

Date	Produced by:	Title	Comments	Cost
1 September 2023	REDACTED	Annual Fire Survey.	Commissioned by REDACTED.	£1,520
11 March 2024	REDACTED	Appraisal of Concrete Frame.		£2,929
12 March 2024	REDACTED	Intolerable and Substantial Risk Letter.	States that fire work is 865 days overdue. Refers to the Firenta Report of 2020 and Litgas Report of 2021.	
5 July 2024	REDACTED	New England House, Unit Assessment and Update.	Identifies LPG Gases in the building and that immediate action is required.	£25,830
26 August 2024	REDACTED	Fire Mitigation Feasibility Estimate.	Estimates the required work at NEH to be £27m	Unknown
3 September 2024	Internal Briefing Note prepared for ESFRS	New England House.	Highlights the serious fire risks in the building.	
9 September 2024	REDACTED	Fire Mitigation Feasibility Estimate.	Now estimates the required work to cost £9m.	Unknown
16 September 2024	REDACTED	Annual Fire Survey.	Commissioned by REDACTED.	£1,520
17 September 2024	REDACTED	Intolerable and Substantial Risk Letter.	States fire safety work is overdue.	
26 September 2024	Internal Briefing Note	New England House, Brighton – Fire and Safety	Issued internally. However, CEO not copied in.	
6 November 2024	REDACTED	Draft Risk Summary	Issued to Architects and Regeneration Officers ahead of a meeting that took place on 7 November 2024.	£8,925

